The mission of “The Bureau of the Political-Military Affairs (PM) builds enduring security partnerships to advance U.S. national security objectives. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is the Department of State’s principal link to the Department of Defense. The PM Bureau provides policy direction in the areas of international security, security assistance, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade.”
POL-MIL bridges the gap between “worlds of diplomacy and defense.” Whereas, POL-MIL Foreign Policy Advisors (POLADs) connect the tissues between the Department of State and Defense. POLADs play an important role at every U.S. embassy, and is nexus between the partner country’s Military of Defense and networks and the United States (the U.S. military-industrial-complex.)
“POLADs inform and shape U.S. national security by integrating foreign policy into defense policy planning. While they wear many hats, the primary role of a POLAD is to bring diplomats and defense leaders together to tackle complex challenges.”
Don’t be surprised when a senior military official is accompanied by POLAD. To put in perspective, the Chief of Staff of the Army is supported by the POLAD Ambassador Laura Dogu. Contextually, the POLAD role is delivered by the U.S. Military, with the expectation that the partner nation will participate in protecting their host country from some perceived evil.
In the United States European Command, POLADs played an integral role in the Russian aggression in Ukraine. The perceived evil in the Russian aggression in Ukraine was no secret. The Russian leaders had made it clear, it was unacceptable to Russia of NATO’s footprint in Ukraine.
The success of the POLADs in Ukraine depends on how one interprets Putin’s objective. If one is of the view that Putin has accomplished his objectives by taking over Donbas, a predominantly Russian-speaking region, then what is left for the European Command and POLADs is to bleed Russia.
Bleeding Russia means a flattened Ukraine and an economic war waged against Russia. Europe is not used to the U.S. long wars. The obvious decision making factors are European comprehension of Russia taking over other countries or realizing their dependence on Russia’s natural resources. POLADs now must worry about Germany easing into the other side, not from fear of Russia, but from her economic thinking.
The Ukraine solution spectrum has three parties. The interest of the United States, which is watching over the interest of the children of the United States explained in Chapter-9 of my scholarship. The Ukraine (or Ethnic East Ukraine) and Russia. Unfortunately, this solution spectrum is out of consideration.
The U.S. POLADs should be mindful of atrophy in the U.S. foreign policy driven by a tradition of unchallenged behavior or from a belief in a given premise from orthodoxy. “Contrary to Chamberlain’s faulty foreign policy (FP) syllogism, which believed Russia wanted to control the whole of China, was Chamberlain’s faulty foreign policy (FP) syllogism and [was] rejected.”
The U.S. POLADs role in Afghanistan was doomed to fail, and not because of the CIA. Declassified CIA documents from Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are precisely on the mark. I am hoping the neocons did not ignore CIA’s guidance during the neocon’s invasion of Afghanistan.
The failure of AF-Pak policy was purely driven by self-proclaimed experts in Afghanistan to carry the forward-policy of neocon first-class war aim. The POLADs and Washington’s mentors, like the proponents of the COIN operations were simply not capable to draw conclusion from more than the 1,800 years of Pashtun’s flux. In stead, Mr. Bruce Riedel proposed a fully resourced COIN operation from his blindsight into the culture. The British gave it their all for 200-years and it did not work.
Pakistan has drawn conclusions as to how much the United States was involved in the April 2022 regime change operation masterminded by the former army Chief Qamar Bajwa. Even Bajwa and his team of trio did not get Pakistan right. The outcome? The United States has lost the support of the people of Pakistan.
POLADs’ policy direction in Pakistan cannot be totally condemned—there are future nuggets for the United States. Those goals were the focus of Obama’s War on terror with roots in Bush’s War, but failed to accomplish. The future policy benefits by the United States should be hard to predict.
Most respectfully, my interpretation of the United States/CIA’s actions in Pakistan, shortly after the August 14, 1947 country’s formation, and all the support provided by the US military-industrial complex, have not necessarily led to desirable outcomes in either Pakistan (or Afghanistan).
That said, is a POLAD in a position to assist the United States with formulating a plan and executing a mission whose focus is to create support for the current and the next generation of Pakistan’s leaders, resulting in a closer alignment of their belief system with that of the Western Civilization value system. The formula is not complicated. However, admitting to what has not worked before is understandably plausible, but working with the ignored intrinsic fundamentals likely requires education on our side.
The “how” to implement is based on understanding the dynamics of the people’s thinking. Their weakness which are also their strengths, (the flux dynamics), are integral to our understanding in furthering a model to enhance our security objectives.
Within the flux dynamics, hope, also an institution of Islam in Pakistanis have become a weakness, but it also plays into Pakistani’s strength. Similarly, corruption is Pakistan army’s weakness but has also strengthened the army. When the same weakness becomes a strength, it becomes difficult if not impossible for foreign doctrines to work against.
Now if a POLAD is capable, and she takes the summation of all the weaknesses that also acts as strengths, she can draw conclusions that would work against what the Pakistan military high command is instructed to do? Thereupon, if a concluded premise becomes that the military high command will lose, what becomes of the U.S. strategic interest in the region that has alienated about hundred-percent of the population and the perceived benefits from PM affairs and POLAD’s expertise, which I claim is marginal for this country.
If the objective is enduring security interest in the region, with a premise to win-over the Pakistani people. Then breaking the corrupt system of political leadership and substituting a call for freedom and liberty at the lowest possible level of society, where the children sit is an important approach for making the next generation of Pakistan’s leaders and it is not the only consideration aspect in the approach.
A POLAD should have the luck (providence) and a higher intellectual capacity to deliver Pakistan (or Afghanistan). To benefit from providence, there is steep and selective criteria. One is, you must have graduated from Georgetown Walsh School of Foreign Service in hopes you were exposed to Dr. Quigley’s work! Quigley was the former Chair of Walsh School of Foreign Service.
Quigley’s scholarship is helpful in promoting new PM narratives benefiting from higher scholastic standards, which POLADs must possess in working with South Asia region. Else, our children and our policy will be at peril as I have argued in my latest scholarship, MANIPULATION OF THE MIND…
The second criterion is benefiting from one’s birth in understanding the ‘DNA’ of 1800 years history of the region (Afghanistan Pakistan). Majority of Pakistanis though born with the benefits of this history cannot conclude from this history because certain ethnic diversity stops them from assessing history and traits to logic out the region in an intellectual manner.