PAKISTAN ARMY SENIOR OFFICER’S ETHOS AND A RECONCILIATION PROCESS

Pakistan Army’s Shift From Institution to Dynasty And Is Next Shift A Mafia?

In a conversation between a senior serving officer and a retired senior officer about the army setting the nation’s direction, the uniformed officer responded with some resentment. He remarked that, having both graduated from the same institution, the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA), and studied the same syllabus, the retired officer, who was once his senior, was no better positioned to advise those currently in uniform.

In reply, the uniformed officer is asked, if the schooling is similar, why he thinks differently than him. That is, the governance of the country is a matter belonging with the people through their elected representatives. The conversation ends.

What has shifted the ideological difference between the point of view of the two officers initially groomed by the same PMA? (Understanding the cause is imperative because those that are students of the Pakistan Army, would agree that the entire senior command holds a similar view.) A few reasons could explain this difference. Here, my focus is on morality as the cause of a difference in viewpoint and singles out a reason for the shift.

 In this article I attempt to complete the dialogue towards reconciliation between the two officers, and set grounds for additional exchange of thought.

Explain Through Law

To proceed, in a recent Connecticut case brought by one of the siblings before the Court, the judge faced a decision. Should the mother of siblings be cremated or buried? In the absence of any legal document left by the deceased as guidance, the judge asked the three siblings what would each desire? The judge ruled in favor of the majority and the deceased in question was buried. 

This Connecticut case instructs us about the moral judgement of siblings. Since, one of the younger siblings desired cremating the body; it being cheaper, also meant pocketing a bigger portion of the inheritance pie. Knowing well their mother had purchased a cemetery lot next to her deceased husband. 

Clearly, all three children were raised by the same institution (the mother), but one desired cremation. This case law fits the predicament at hand between the two officers and bears the hallmark of moral judgement.

Extending the thought, regretfully, the current army command imprisoned their eighty year old instructor Gen. Shoaib, for his instructive guidance similar to the first retired officer. Gen. Shoaib has also passed out from the same institution, but he extended his unsolicited advice on a television and his YouTube channel. The imprisonment of their instructor is not an outlier incident of a moral judgement on behalf of the uniformed officers.

In reference to the original conversation between the officers, as mentioned, involves a moral judgment call. Who is right or wrong can be addressed from a legal framework known as a ‘matter of law.’

A matter of law refers to a legal precedent that applies a principle of law in litigation. Since Pakistan’s Constitution explicitly prohibits the army from engaging in politics. In legal terms the principle, a matter of law would mean, there is no ambiguity, and the case would be dismissed. For example, if a serving officer brought the issue to court, seeking to prevent the retired officer from making his argument, the judge would apply the relevant legal standards ‘as a matter of law’ and dismiss the case through a Summary Judgment Order.

It would be unproductive for me to delve further into the morality of the issue beyond what I’ve already addressed. However, one could reasonably argue that the army’s reluctance to relinquish control over the country is driven by material interests.

Anyone not agreeing to the aforesaid narrative requires l make additional arguments. Like, questioning Gen. Bajwa to explain how he got his declared wealth in the name of his wife. Oh! I forget. These very same people have passed a law that forbids a State prosecutor to question the sources of wealth accumulation. The new law requires the State to find out the whereabouts of those funds. Decent societies don’t make such laws.

Influence From Reconciliation

I believe that before the gap in understanding widens further between those who have the opportunity to influence each other’s perspectives, it would be wise to pursue a sincere reconciliation dialogue within a defined framework, a two point agenda identified for a reconciliation process as follows:

1. The army is acting outside of the rule of law or Constitution. (The army deposed Khan’s government and later around April 2022, when parliament was dissolved, the army did not allow elections within 90-days mandated by the Constitution. These are just two examples.) One of the requirements of capitalism and its principle of investment is to have a rule of law. Else, the capitalists will not find Pakistan ripe for investment.

There are several good definitions of investment. It is unlikely, Pakistan will perform to the requirements of those definitions in the absence of the rule of law. 

Asking companies to invest in mining operations in a country is a specific form of “investment,” and as seen, this deal is benefiting the investors. One reason, the absence of the rule of law would mean the investors covering their investment with favorable terms to them. These investments may not fully capture the broader concept of investment compared to encouraging foreign companies to develop industries and utilize a country’s human resources and talent.

2. The survival of the army as an enterprise, institution or a dynasty is the issue at hand. I recently wrote an article where I proceeded with the premise that the Pakistan Army is a dynasty. In support of that assertion, I place a diagnostic criterion to test against.

Components Of Dynasty

Dynasty has a centralized chain of command, legitimacy by maintaining power, limited political participation, pragmatism over principles, focus on self preservation rather than public welfare, suppression of diversity and dissent, and national identity may be overshadowed by the identity and narrative of the ruling dynasty. 

Interestingly, the entire dynasty’s diagnostic framework applies to the Pakistan Army. Specifically, the salient few, pragmatism over principles and suppressing diversity.

The Assessment

The moral argument of the officer in uniform, claiming to hold similar education gives the retired officer no upper hand or a right to question the new direction the present lot of generals are taking the country into, is an example of pragmatism over principles.

Additionally, the evidence of ethnic Pashtuns being eliminated from the army’s high command positions is another diagnostic test to frame the army as a dynasty. There is not a single Pashtun General in the current army. The one ethnic Khattak, a Pashtun promoted this year, on grounds of always conforming to the army mold, is a good reason to eliminates him from the count. However, in 1947, the Pakistan army had 50-percent Pashtun generals. None now.

If you come to a conclusion that the aforementioned diagnostic test criteria applies and the Pakistan Army in fact squeaks like a dynasty, we can make additional conclusions.

The point of view divergence between the two officers, though graduates of the same institution with the same syllabus is due to how the army has transitioned into.

Conclusively, there is evidence the retired officer’s viewpoint resonates with institutional morality and the one in uniform exhibits pragmatism in a dynasty without an ideology. Nothing, the Abbasid Dynasty’s ideology was the Muslim Shariah law.

The survival of the dynasty takes a priority over everything else; even ideology. For this reason, the uniformed officer said what he said and why Gen. Shoaib was imprisoned.

The next essential question is: How can a dynasty survive? It needs unity and this aspect is argued in the article here.

A similar exercise is necessary should the proponent’s alternate choices are Enterprise or an Institution, and ask how either can survive in a country that is in a state of dis-unity. 

Calling Pakistan Army an institution is a struggling concept. One of the requirements of calling an entity an institution requires that it must be recognized and accepted by society as a legitimate authority or organization. This legitimacy may come from laws, traditions, and general social acceptance. The Army in a nose-dive is reaching the point of losing the general social acceptance of her societies.

In either conclusion, dynasty, enterprise or an institution, how do you fit the welfare of the people? 

The Unintended Shift—Mafia?

In Calculus there is a concept of horizontal shift in a function, whereby a function becomes something else. Extending the concept, what rate of change or a change is required to shift dynasty into a Mafia? And we can have answers. One is, to lose control over institutions and legitimacy. Once this condition is met, it would have untold significance for every one of us. A Mafia family like no other. 

Reconciliation

Reconciliation is a measure of a shift. Possibly going back to its original form is the goal. In calculus it is called shifting back to its original function.

Reconciliation steps require effort with gestures. Beginning with soft gestures first, to set grounds for a set of hard gestures. Soft gestures would soften the grounds for addressing accountability measures where the population will learn forgiveness. The hard gestures would include, but not limited to restoration of the rule of law and reviving ideology principles. 

Reconciliation is an arduous journey. In a soft gesture phase, certain reconciliation choices may not be easy ones to reconcile. One may recommend restoring Maj. Adil Raja’s commission, who was Court Martial around the first of this year. Time heals, and may accommodate a review of his Court Martial.

The other path is to maneuver in a perpetual state of dis-unity, putting out fires by micromanaging and heading closer and closer to an economic debacle. 

If I can address the economy. If one of the measures in an economic model is to digitally float a gold standard currency that will cut inflation closer to zero, and if this model turns out to be a sensible one, organizations like the World Bank and the IMF would not allow. This is a fact.

Expecting a dynasty or any other variant that you can intellectually define the army with, it cannot have the luxury to propose an indigenous economic model and maintain consensus (national and international unity.)

Logical Conclusion

 In a Civitas framework, one can implement the people’s mandate because those that are associated with the governance model are shielded from a foreign country’s foreign policy toolbox threats. The army personnel are not.

I am perplexed when Pakistan reaches out to Pakistani origin financial experts abroad and are earnestly employed to help Pakistan. They can’t. Regardless of their sincerity and their personal views, those apples cannot fall further from its tree.

In the absence of reconciliation, Pakistan will reduce to, where each is left to do what is necessary. 

The army cannot bring economic prosperity to Pakistan. Those models need a foreign approval and what the army is doing in Pakistan enjoys a foreign backing. As a dynasty, with pragmatism the choice is clear–the survival of the dynasty is a priority.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, an influential 18th-century philosopher has explained poverty,

“When the people shall have nothing more to eat, they will eat the rich.”

Bio: Mian Hameed is the author of MANIPULATION OF THE MIND: Our Children and Our Policy at Peril. He is a student of the U.S. and South Asia foreign policy. My articles do not present the conventional thoughts of the mainstream media. To read my work, click the Home link below.